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Abstract
Background: Since 2003, Asia-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia, has received substantial attention because of the 
anticipation that it could be the epicentre of the next pandemic. There has been active investment but earlier review of 
pandemic preparedness plans in the region reveals that the translation of these strategic plans into operational plans is 
still lacking in some countries particularly those with low resources. The objective of this study is to understand the 
pandemic preparedness programmes, the health systems context, and challenges and constraints specific to the six 
Asian countries namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Taiwan, Thailand, and Viet Nam in the prepandemic phase 
before the start of H1N1/2009.
Methods: The study relied on the Systemic Rapid Assessment (SYSRA) toolkit, which evaluates priority disease 
programmes by taking into account the programmes, the general health system, and the wider socio-cultural and 
political context. The components under review were: external context; stewardship and organisational arrangements; 
financing, resource generation and allocation; healthcare provision; and information systems. Qualitative and 
quantitative data were collected in the second half of 2008 based on a review of published data and interviews with 
key informants, exploring past and current patterns of health programme and pandemic response.
Results: The study shows that health systems in the six countries varied in regard to the epidemiological context, 
health care financing, and health service provision patterns. For pandemic preparation, all six countries have developed 
national governance on pandemic preparedness as well as national pandemic influenza preparedness plans and Avian 
and Human Influenza (AHI) response plans. However, the governance arrangements and the nature of the plans 
differed. In the five developing countries, the focus was on surveillance and rapid containment of poultry related 
transmission while preparation for later pandemic stages was limited. The interfaces and linkages between health 
system contexts and pandemic preparedness programmes in these countries were explored.
Conclusion: Health system context influences how the six countries have been preparing themselves for a pandemic. 
At the same time, investment in pandemic preparation in the six Asian countries has contributed to improvement in 
health system surveillance, laboratory capacity, monitoring and evaluation and public communications. A number of 
suggestions for improvement were presented to strengthen the pandemic preparation and mitigation as well as to 
overcome some of the underlying health system constraints.
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Background
"World 'well prepared' for virus" is the title of a news arti-
cle from the BBC on 27 April 2009, a day the World
Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza
pandemic alert from Phase 3 to Phase 4 [1]. The article
cited a high-level WHO officer who commented that "the
international community is better prepared than ever" to
handle the potential influenza pandemic, because several
years of preparation for avian flu had helped countries
build up stockpiles of antiviral drugs globally. On the
same day, a spokesman for the WHO Regional Office for
the Western Pacific declared that "Asia is better prepared
and in a better position than others" citing experience in
management of and response to the Severe Acute Respi-
ratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak which affected the
Region in 2003 [2].
Having established a large antiviral stockpile and/or
having experience with SARS does not necessarily mean
that a country is well equipped to face an influenza pan-
demic. Preparedness is a complex phenomenon which
involves many aspects, including disease surveillance,
case management, command and control, and commu-
nity containment [3]. Earlier studies on the completeness
of national pandemic influenza preparedness plans in
several regions reveal that many challenges and impor-
tant gaps in preparedness remain [4-9]. Besides, these
studies show that the level of preparedness varies hugely
across and within regions. The situation in developing
countries is the most worrisome as their public health
infrastructure is often weak with severe shortage in finan-
cial, human, and technical resources [7,10-12].
Since 2003, Asia-Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia,
has received substantial attention because of the anticipa-
tion that it could be the epicentre of the next pandemic.
There has been active investment in preparedness strat-
egy and planning in many countries by both domestic and
international players. Despite such strong interest and
investment, a review of strategic pandemic preparedness
plans in Asia in 2006 and a report on regional prepared-
ness published by the United Nations System Influenza
Coordinator (UNSIC) in 2007 reveals that the translation
of these strategic plans into operational plans is still lack-
ing in many countries in the region [4,13].
This paper presents the results from a rapid situation
analysis (RSA) of health system and pandemic prepared-
ness in six countries of the Asia-Pacific region prior to
the H1N1/2009 epidemic. Taiwan had extensive experi-
ence with the SARS outbreak, with over 300 confirmed
cases. Viet Nam, Thailand, and Indonesia also had SARS
cases (albeit fewer than Taiwan) and, together with Lao
PDR and Cambodia, have had human Avian Influenza
cases. Besides, endemicity of the influenza subtype H5N1
is found in poultry in these five countries.
The objectives of this rapid situation analysis are to
describe the pandemic preparedness programmes and
the health systems context in which these programmes
have been established, and to identify challenges and con-
straints specific to the six countries. It is a part of a bigger
project, the AsiaFluCap project, which aims to evaluate
health system capacity in these countries in response to
different phases of influenza pandemic. The study was
conducted in the second half of 2008 with funding sup-
port from the European Union and the Rockefeller Foun-
dation.
Methods
This study relies on the Systemic Rapid Assessment
(SYSRA) Toolkit which is a systematic approach for gath-
ering information about structures and modes of opera-
tion from complex health systems [14]. It builds on the
SYSRA Framework, a conceptual and analytical frame-
work initially developed by Atun et al. to evaluate health
systems and communicable disease control programmes
[15,16]. The SYSRA analytical framework provides a con-
ceptual, analytical framework and tool to evaluate health
interventions that takes into account disease pro-
grammes, the general health system, and the wider socio-
cultural and political context. For the purpose of this
study, this framework was adapted to pandemic influ-
enza. Our SYSRA toolkit comprises of two core elements:
(i) the 'health systems element' and (ii) the 'pandemic pre-
paredness programme element' (Figure 1). The health
systems element focuses on structures and functionality
of an overall health system (horizontal level). The 'pan-
demic preparedness programme element' assesses the
specific pandemic influenza programme components
embedded within a health system (vertical level). For
each element, the components under review are: external
context; stewardship and organisational arrangements;
financing, resource generation and allocation; healthcare
provision; and information systems.
The study was conducted in the second half of 2008.
For each of the RSA modules qualitative and quantitative
data were collected based on a review of published data,
documentation and interviews with key informants in
each country. As a first step, secondary data and docu-
mentation was reviewed and summarised for each coun-
try in order to determine what information was available
and what data was lacking. Afterwards, an interview team
consisting of members (public health specialists) familiar
with the health system and pandemic management pro-
gramme in the country conducted interviews with key
informants using a predefined semi-structured question-
naire, focusing especially on gaps identified in the initial
literature review. The questions explored past and cur-
rent patterns of health programme response, changes in
pandemic response and other historical informationHanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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about outbreak management. While conducting the
interviews, additional qualitative and quantitative infor-
mation were collected through an iterative process of
information gathering.
K e y  i n f o r m a n t s  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r
expertise in a broad range of health system and pandemic
p r o g r a m m e  c o m p o n e n t s .  T h e y  w e r e  c h o s e n  f r o m  a l l
administrative levels and from different institutions to
provide a triangulated view of the health system and of
the pandemic management programme. Field visits
occurred between October to December 2008 with up to
21 key informants being interviewed in each country. No
remuneration was provided to the informants. The lists
of field researchers and the affiliations and roles of the
k ey informants fr om each country are pr ovided in the
Country Case Study Reports available publicly accessible
on the website: http://www.cdprg.org/publications. Ethi-
cal approval for this project was obtained from all partici-
pating countries.
The scope of this study is limited to health system and
health service response and preparation for pandemic
influenza. Non-health sector preparation and mitigation
efforts are beyond the scope of this analysis. The choice
of the six countries is based on an historical assessment
that they would likely be at the epicentre of an influenza
pandemic, the incidence of H5N1 in poultry, and their
experience with SARS.
Results
Context and health system characteristics
The country contexts in the six study countries vary con-
siderably. The political systems include republic (Taiwan
and Indonesia), constitutional monarchy (Thailand and
Cambodia), and socialist republic (Vietnam and Lao
PDR). The level of economic development based on
Figure 1 Components of the Systemic Rapid Assessment Toolkit (SYSRA).Hanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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World Bank's classification ranges from low income with
high agricultural share (Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Viet
Nam), middle income (Thailand and Indonesia) to indus-
trialized and high income (Taiwan). There is, however,
similarity in that all countries enjoyed relative political
stability (except recently in Thailand) and continuous
economic growth over the past decade preceding the cur-
rent global economic crisis.
Health systems in the six countries vary in regard to the
current health status and epidemiological profile, the
level of health care resource, health financing mecha-
nisms and health service provision patterns (Table 1).
• Current health status and epidemiological profile
Taiwan shows a pattern of industrialized economies
post epidemiological transition with low mortality, high
life expectancy, and high disease burden from chronic
diseases. In contrast to Taiwan, Lao PDR and Cambodia
have lower life expectancy with high morbidity and mor-
tality from communicable diseases.
• Level of healthcare resources
The level of health system resources reflects the level of
economic development. Taiwan has a high level of health
spending and high density of hospital beds and health
workforce per capita. On the other end of the spectrum,
Cambodia and Lao PDR have low health spending and
very low health facility and health workforce density.
External resources are a significant source of health
financing in Cambodia and Lao PDR.
• Health financing mechanisms
Only Taiwan and Thailand have universal coverage of
health insurance. Indonesia and Viet Nam have a number
of health insurance schemes such as social security
scheme and government employee health insurance for
different sectors of the population. Lao PDR and Cambo-
dia relied mainly on out-of-pocket payments with recent
development of community financing. Lao PDR is devel-
oping social security insurance.
• Health service provision
Health service provision patterns in the six countries
are mixed. The private sector plays a major role in Tai-
Table 1: Selected indicators of health system contexts in 6 study countries.
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Taiwan Thailand Viet Nam
Population (in thousands) 14,197 228,864 5,759 22,880 63,444 86,206
Human Development Index* 0.575 0.726 0.608 0.93 2005 0.786 0.718
GDP per capita (current US$) 512 # 1,592 # 591 # 16,740 & 3,258 # 708 #
Adult literacy rate (%) 73.6 2004 90.4 2004 68.7 2001 96.1 2003& 92.6 2000 90.3 1999
Life expectancy at birth (years) both sexes 62 68 60 77.89 72 72
Hospital beds (per 10,000 population) 1 2004 5.2 2005^ 12 2005 57.3 ^ 21.4 2005^ 26.6
Physicians density (per 10,000) 2 2000 1 2003 4 2004 16 2007 4 2000 6 2002
Nursing and midwifery personnel density (per 
10,000)
9 2000 8 2003 10 2004 43.1 2007 28 2000 8 2002
Total expenditure on health as percentage of 
GDP
6 2.2 3.6 6.1 3.5 6.6
Per capita total expenditure on health (US$) 30 34 22 970 2005 113 46
Skilled birth attendance (%) 44 66 19 N/A 97 88
Note: Data are from WHO http://www.who.int/whosis/ for the year 2006 unless specify otherwise;
*HDI from UNDP Human Development Report; #GDP per Capita from World Bank's World Development Indicators;
^ Hospital bed density for Taiwan from Department of Health, for Indonesia from Public Health Expenditure Review 2008 by the World Bank, and 
for Thailand from Thailand Health Profile 2005-7;
&GDP per capita and Adult literacy rate for Taiwan are from CIA World Fact Book.Hanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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wan. In both Thailand and Viet Nam, the public sector
has an extensive network of public health facilities. How-
ever, a significant proportion of population is increasingly
using private sector health care providers such as drug
stores and private clinics as their first source of health
care. In Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Cambodia, the avail-
ability of health facilities is quite limited as seen in the
density of hospital beds which is at 1 per 1,000 or less.
One indicator of health service access is the proportion of
skilled birth attendance. The statistics in 2006 shows that
the proportion was over 80% in Thailand and Viet Nam,
around two-third in Indonesia, nearly 50% in Cambodia
and less than 20% in Lao PDR in 2006.
Pandemic preparedness programme
All countries in this study have experienced an outbreak
of SARS or avian influenza in humans (Table 2). During
the SARS outbreak, Taiwan was severely affected with
346 casualties. There were 63, nine, and two confirmed
cases in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia respectively
[17]. For Avian and Human Influenza (AHI), more than
100 human cases have been reported each in Viet Nam
and Indonesia, 25 in Thailand, eight in Cambodia, and
two in Lao PDR. There were no AHI cases in Taiwan.
All six countries have developed national governance
on AHI and pandemic preparedness. They all have
national pandemic preparedness plans and AHI response
plans. However, the governance arrangements and the
nature of the plans differ across the countries. Moreover,
the operational procedures as well as strategic directions
vary. This section presents the preparedness arrange-
ments in regard to governance and stewardship, financial
resources, other resources, and health service provision
in the study period.
• Governance & Stewardship
In all countries, the pandemic preparedness commit-
tees were headed by the president or prime minister or
his/her representative. In Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Thai-
land the national pandemic preparedness plans and the
AHI response plans were integrated together with AHI
response plan as a part of pandemic preparedness plan.
The other countries had separated plans for pandemic
preparedness from the AHI response plans.
At the central/national level, there were three main pat-
terns of pandemic preparedness governance. First, as in
Lao PDR and Indonesia, a special coordination unit
(National AHI Coordination Office (NAHICO) which
recently changed its name to National Emerging Infec-
tious Diseases Coordination Office (NEIDCO) in Lao
PDR, and National Committee for AI Control and Pan-
demic Preparedness (KOMNAS) for Indonesia) was
established specifically to coordinate AHI and pandemic
related activities as a priority programme (vertical policy
approach). Second, in Vietnam, the governance relies on
existing governance structure e.g. responsible agencies
only. Third, in Cambodia, Taiwan and Thailand, pan-
demic preparedness is situated as part of programmes on
disaster preparedness and mitigation so the preparation
for pandemic is framed within the national disaster
response.
There was also a difference in the governance in regard
to the level of responsibility. This reflects the existing
governance structure and the nature of devolution of gov-
erning power in the country. In Cambodia, Lao PDR, Tai-
wan, Thailand, where resource allocation decisions are
centralized, the budget allocation towards AHI and pan-
demic preparedness programmes was also decided
mostly at central level. In Indonesia and Viet Nam, cen-
tral authority was important but local authorities also
played crucial roles in the decision and priority setting of
Table 2: SARS and AHI Cases.
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Taiwan Thailand Viet Nam
Total SARS Cases (reported probable cases)* 0 2 0 665 9 63
Total Human AHI Cases# 8 141 2 0 25 110
Total Human Deaths from AHI# 7 115 2 0 17 55
Case Fatality Ratio (Deaths/All Cases) # 88% 82% 100% - 68% 50%
Provinces with Human AHI Cases/Total 
Provinces
5 of 24 13 of 33 1 of 17 0 of 25 18 of 76 32 of 64
Note: *from WHO: Summary table of SARS cases by country, 1 November 2002 - 7 August 2003 http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/
2003_08_15/en/index.html;
#Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO as of 23 April 2009 http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/avian_influenza/country/en/index.htmlHanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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the level of pandemic preparedness investment in their
regions. Nevertheless, in all countries the operational
activities of pandemic preparation at the local level were
allocated to/integrated within the network of existing
government bodies.
• Financial resource
Data on government and external spending for AHI
and preparedness are not readily available and our best
estimate shows that most countries spent around 1 USD
per capita per year or less on these activities (Table 3).
Whereas the level of to the disease was highest in 2006
and 2007, it declined in 2008. Funding solely or mostly
originated from central budget, except in Indonesia and
Viet Nam where the local source of funding was also
important, and to a lesser extent in Thailand. All coun-
tries but Cambodia, had discretionary budget for local
level administration to use on AHI and pandemic prepa-
ration.
External resources have been substantial for low
income countries, particularly Lao PDR and Cambodia.
Almost the entire budget for AHI and pandemic pre-
paredness activities in Lao PDR and Cambodia was pro-
vided by external donors and international organizations.
Indonesia also drew in a significant amount of external
funding for AHI and pandemic preparedness, accounting
for almost one-fourth of total budget. There was no
external financial support for Taiwan and less than 3 per-
cent in Thailand. No data was available for Vietnam.
• Other resources: human resource, vaccine, drugs, 
technology
In all six countries, pandemic preparedness activities at
the operational level relied on existing healthcare work-
force in the public sector. Hence human resources avail-
able for AHI are reflective of the health workforce
situation in public health system. Shortage of highly
skilled workers was a major problem in all developing
countries, especially in relation to physicians and nurses.
In regard to specific knowledge and skills for pandemic
influenza, additional trainings were provided to specific
sections of the workforce in all countries, particularly to
those working in surveillance, case detection, and infec-
tion control. Most, except Taiwan and Viet Nam, did not
have a plan for surge capacity of health care workers dur-
ing pandemic time. Moreover, there is a question over
potential absenteeism among existing workforce at the
time of pandemic.
All countries have strengthened their laboratory inves-
tigation capacity to prepare for the potential pandemic.
All, except Lao PDR, had Biosafety Level 3 (BSL 3) labo-
ratory capacity and can conduct virus sequencing. These
five countries were also capable of immuno-fluorescence
assay (IFA) and reverse transcription- polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR). Only Taiwan had the capacity to pro-
duce pre-pandemic vaccine and has a plan to increase its
capacity towards pandemic vaccine production by 2010.
Indonesia, Thailand, Viet Nam had plans, or were in the
process of conducting research, towards developing their
pandemic vaccine production capacity. Taiwan, Thailand,
and Indonesia had local capacity to produce antiviral
drugs from chemical entities.
All countries had stockpiles of antivirals and personal
protective equipment (PPE) but the size of the stockpiles
varied across countries. In Taiwan, the national stockpile
was enough to treat 10% of population and there is a plan
to increase this stockpile if necessary. The national stock-
piles of Thailand and Indonesia covered approximately
1% of their population while in Cambodia the national
stock in Phnom Penh was enough for 0.1% of the popula-
tion (15,780 doses). We were unable to estimate the size
of the stockpiles in Lao PDR and Viet Nam from key
informants or reviewed documents. In most countries,
the antiviral stockpiles were located at both central level
and at hospital and local health authorities. In addition to
national stockpiles, there was an ASEAN regional stock-
pile in Singapore.
• Health service
Health service preparedness for pandemic influenza
highly concentrated on surveillance and rapid contain-
ment activities in all countries but Taiwan. The surveil-
lance systems were mainly facility and community based
surveillance systems where suspected cases are reported
to the central level authority for further investigation and
Table 3: Estimated AHI and Pandemic preparedness Budget 
in Million USD (USD per capita in parenthesis).
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Cambodia* 0.034
(0.002)
1.48
(0.1)
3.02
(0.2)
Lao PDR 11.44
(2.0)
2.1
(0.4)
6.42
(1.1)
Indonesia 55.0
(0.2)
93.8
(0.4)
6.1
(0.0)
Taiwan 14.5
(0.6)
24.5
(1.1)
53.0
(2.3)
57.0
(2.5)
22.5
(1.0)
Thailand# 35
(0.6)
58
(0.9)
44
(0.7)
Viet Nam# 82.2
(1.0)
Note: * only budget for ADB CDC Regional Project; # Government 
budget onlyHanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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containment. Several channels for case reporting have
been set up including telephone hotline, SMS, email and
websites. All countries except Lao PDR also conducted
laboratory surveillance of samples from influenza-like-ill-
ness cases.
The surveillance system for pandemic influenza in the
five countries with history of AHI focused on poultry
related cases. When there were animal cases of avian
influenza in the neighbourhood, patients with influenza-
like illness with history of poultry contacts would be spe-
cially monitored. In these countries active collaboration
between human and animal health sectors to conduct
joint surveillance was reported. Also, Surveillance Rapid
Response Teams (SRRTs) have been set up at both central
level and local level based on existing capacity, to be read-
ily available for field investigation when there is a sus-
pected case. In countries with shortage of qualified
human resources, the surveillance and response capacity
at local level remains a major challenge. Only Taiwan and
Viet Nam had explicit plans for surveillance and response
in time of pandemic.
All countries have assigned referral hospitals to take
care of AHI cases in the pre-pandemic phases. A model
hospital preparedness plan has been developed in most
countries to be used by their health facilities in time of
pandemic. Hospital surge capacity (extra beds) has been
planned in all countries but Lao PDR and Cambodia.
Similar to surveillance and response, only Taiwan and
Viet Nam had an explicit staff surge capacity plan. Lao
PDR and Taiwan had additional plans to use volunteer in
time of pandemic.
In regard to case management, the focus was mainly on
AHI cases. Clinical treatment guidelines for AHI infec-
tion have been developed in all countries. Training on
clinical management of AHI cases has been conducted
with patient isolation and antiviral treatment as the main
instruments. In all countries there was a policy to provide
antiviral prophylaxis to AHI contacts. However, there
was no clear rationing policy on antiviral distribution in
case of pandemic. All countries (except Taiwan which has
not reported any case) have provided free care to all AHI
patients thus far.
In the five countries where human cases have been
reported, most infected patients arrived at hospital after
their symptoms had developed for several days. In these
countries, a patient generally seeks self medication or
informal/private primary-care providers as his/her first
contact point and only visit public health facilities when
the symptoms are severe. This is compounded by the rel-
ative lack of health care facilities in lower resource coun-
tries like Cambodia and Lao and the high use of private
care facilities in Cambodia.
There were active public health education efforts in all
countries. In the countries with AHI cases, most of the
messages and materials were related to the handling of
livestock and basic health hygiene such as hand washing,
protection when sneezing/coughing. The main strategy
of public health education was to focus on the prevention
of Avian Influenza transmission (e.g. use chicken as a
mascot, etc). Very few messages were on pandemic influ-
enza.
A number of simulation exercises have been conducted
in all six countries. Most of the exercises were table-top
style where relevant officers discuss and manage a hypo-
thetical pandemic situation in a round-table manner. For
example, Thailand had at least one table-top exercise at
the central level and in each province. Viet Nam has con-
ducted many simulations for AHI preparedness at
national, provincial and district level as well as at airport
and borders. There were also a few regional (multi-coun-
try) table-top exercises coordinated by the World Health
Organization and one table-top exercise by the Mekong
Basin Disease Surveillance Network (MBDS). Only Indo-
nesia and Taiwan had full-scale exercises involving real
field activities. Indonesia's full-scale exercise in Bali in
April 2008 was the first of its kind in the world. Taiwan's
full-scale exercise at its national airport focused on its
response to the arrival by plane of a suspected H5N1
case. Most exercises reveal that management and coordi-
nation between various players, including non-health
sector players, constitutes a major weakness in prepared-
ness. A criticism common to all six countries is that most
simulations exercises have focused on early containment
but not on pandemic preparedness in later phases.
The preparation for mitigation efforts at more
advanced stages of a pandemic was quite limited in most
countries. They have identified various channels for risk
communication to the public. However, only Taiwan had
clear operation procedures to sustain service provision
and resource mobilization when widespread pandemic
occurs. The researchers also found that knowledge/skills
for pandemic preparation at local level were more limited
than central level staff.
Discussion
The rapid analyses in six Asian countries show a strong
link between the health system functions and pandemic
preparation. In all countries, the health system context
shapes how pandemic preparedness in the country is car-
ried out. From the RSA we found that the interfaces/link-
ages between health system contexts and pandemic
preparedness programmes are particularly strong in
three areas: governance and stewardship, resources, and
service provision.
The arrangements and strength of governance and
stewardship of pandemic preparedness programme fol-
low those of the general health system. In well-estab-
l i s h e d  h e a l t h  s y s t e m s ,  p a n d e m i c  p r e p a r e d n e s s  i sHanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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integrated within existing mechanisms, notably within
the national disaster preparedness framework. In coun-
tries with a weak healthcare system, new vertical pro-
gramme had to be established to manage and coordinate
pandemic preparedness and response.
The nature of pandemic governance also depends on
the existing political context. Decentralized countries
h a v e  g r e a t e r  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  d e a l  w i t h  d u r i n g  b o t h  o u t -
breaks and pandemics. In a decentralized system like in
Indonesia, the level of political commitment could affect
the level of investment in pandemic preparedness in that
region/area as seen in the contrasting difference between
Bali and Jakarta. In Jakarta, where political interest on
pandemic is low, the planned table-top simulation exer-
cise was postponed because of the lack of budget while in
Bali, a full-scale exercise was carried out with strong sup-
port from all sectors.
The political and historical context also shapes the pan-
demic preparedness process. For example, the political
crisis in Thailand in 2008 resulted in frequent changes of
Minister of Public Health and several postponements of
national pandemic preparedness committee meetings. In
Taiwan, pandemic preparation is high on national politi-
cal agenda because of its previous history of SARS out-
break and casualties as well as a perceived threat of
bioterrorism.
The level of resource available for pandemic prepared-
ness depends on the level of economic and health system
development of the country. The amount of financial
investment in preparedness activities and stockpiling of
drugs and equipments is dependent on the level of budget
availability. Countries with low financial resource need to
rely on external funding for their pandemic preparedness
activities. The series of H5N1 outbreaks which have
occurred in the region since 2003 combined to the
heightened global interests in averting a pandemic have
allowed many low resource countries to draw in financial
resources to support their preparation especially for sur-
veillance and early detection. However, there are ques-
tions about the sustainability of these external resources
given the current global economic recession and other
public health priorities in donor countries themselves.
Such resources might also be much more difficult to
mobilize during pandemic time. Similarly, the shortage of
highly skilled workers in the general health system has
b e e n  r a i s e d  a s  a  m a j o r  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e p a r e d n e s s
planning and response in many of these countries. This
situation could be even more serious in pandemic time
when a number of staff may become ill with the disease
and some of them may be absent due to the fear of infec-
tion.
Health service provision for AHI control relies pri-
marily on the existing provider system. The main strategy
used in all countries but Taiwan is to focus on early detec-
tion and containment. Investment was made into rapid
response team and surveillance mechanisms with atten-
tion to the linkages between poultry infection and human
cases. This strategy may be driven by several factors. The
emergence of human cases of H5N1 may have led each of
the five countries to strongly assume that outbreaks of
human-to-human transmission could start within their
own country. Moreover, the potential threat of the H5N1
pandemic also drew external funding whose main interest
may have been to rapidly contain avian influenza out-
breaks within the region, hence investment in surveil-
lance and case detection. Besides, the lack of internal
resources may have yield to limited investment in phar-
maceutical interventions such as antiviral and vaccine
stockpiling. The WHO Pandemic classification system
into various phases could have also influenced countries
into investing first in preparedness for the earlier phases
and to delay preparedness for the later phases, although
phases will remain fluid during a pandemic as the H1N1/
2009 has demonstrated.
Investment in pandemic preparedness activities has
contributed to the strengthening of health system func-
tions in many countries specifically in regards to surveil-
lance, laboratory capacity, monitoring and evaluation,
and public communication. Regionally, there has been
active cooperation through the surveillance network in
the Mekong basin through the Mekong Basin Disease
Surveillance network (MBDS). These health system func-
tions could be useful for other diseases beyond pandemic
response. However, the low investment in clinical care in
relation to other health services may be a big challenge
for these countries, especially if a pandemic is to expand
beyond the early containment phase.
Improving pandemic preparedness and health system 
strengthening
The outbreak of influenza H1N1/2009 and its spread
globally also raises many important questions on how
prepared these Asian countries are for global pandemic
influenza. The underlying assumption that the pandemic
would start from avian influenza virus mutation within
the country led to heavy investment on surveillance and
case detection mechanisms in the five developing coun-
tries. These mechanisms were designed primarily for
AHI with reliance on poultry contact history in the sur-
veillance and case detection operational guidelines and
unlikely to be effective for early-detection and contain-
ment of pandemic influenza now that human-to-human
transmission has been observed without an animal tracer.
The pandemic response strategy and the surveillance and
case detection protocols in these countries need to be
transformed to accommodate this changing circum-
stance. It is also important to translate existing pandemic
response and mitigation plans into operations particu-Hanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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larly at the subnational level as local administration and
communities need to be active and ready for these plans
to be effective.
Limited stockpiles of the antivirals, covering 1% or less
of the population in all countries other than Taiwan, raise
the issue of drug allocation when a large-scale high-
impact pandemic occurs. The World Health Organiza-
tion recommended countries to stockpile antivirals for
20% of their population but this is obviously not feasible
financially for many developing countries [10,12]. Simi-
larly, it is already clear with the H1N1/2009 outbreak that
when the pandemic vaccine is developed its availability
will be limited [18]. Explicit rationing or prioritization
policy for the medicines and vaccines is necessary and
should be developed to avoid ethical and political con-
flicts that may arise [19-21].
The ongoing threat of pandemic influenza with human-
to-human transmission also calls for a revision/reposition
of public education campaigns that were shown to be
focusing on animal to human transmission in many
Southeast Asian countries. The message requires adjust-
ment from current emphasis on animal handling hygiene
to respiratory health hygiene and when to seek medical
care. The current treatment strategy to rely on a referral
hospital system may also need to be adjusted towards
community level surge capacity and the use of volunteers
to support the system in time of pandemic. Simulation
exercises with phase 6 hypothetical scenarios could be
useful as a test of the level of preparedness especially with
actors from non-health sector.
For the preparation to be effective and sustainable, the
interventions need not only focus on the influenza
related activities. Our study shows that health systems
provide important context towards the success of the
responses. The effort to strengthen pandemic prepared-
ness should also be done in such a way that also strength-
ens health systems. Three areas of improvement based on
our findings of strong linkages between pandemic prepa-
ration and health systems in governance and stewardship,
health system resource, and service provision are high-
lighted here.
Firstly, the governance and stewardship of AHI and
pandemic preparedness should be integrated into the
broader disaster preparedness system. Taiwan benefited
from more resources from higher level of economic
development but comprehensive and multisectoral
responses with commitment from all levels also resulted
from high political interest and a systematic approach to
preparedness using disaster and bioterrorism response
system. National ownership of the preparedness activities
is particularly important especially in low resource coun-
tries where external funding is prominent. The allocation
decision of pandemic related investment should be har-
monised and aligned with national systems and priorities.
Secondly, the scarcity of health care resources particu-
larly in rural areas was shown to hamper the preparation
for the pandemic as well as the responses to other dis-
eases. Scaling up health system capacity such as health
workforce and health care infrastructure is necessary and
should be decided based on evidence together with effec-
tive planning. For example, the countries can benefit
from the AsiaFluCap project's ongoing analysis of health
system resource gaps to effectively respond to pandemic.
Nevertheless, investment in health workforce and health
care infrastructure should avoid disease-specific focus
and contribute to overall system strengthening [22]. A
number of tools and proposed actions for scaling up dis-
ease specific capacity that also promote health system
strengthening are increasingly available [22-24].
Lastly, in service provision the preparedness strategy
also needs to address the prominent role of the private
sector. Private providers are the first contact point for
health care in many countries. In many countries where
the linkage of information system between public and
private sector does not exist, the surveillance system may
not be able to detect the cases early enough before it has
already spread. Treatment success could also be lower
and the fatality rate could be higher if the patients present
themselves late to public health care system where antivi-
ral medicines are prescribed. The pandemic and disaster
responses could also tap into the capacity of private non-
profit network and volunteers to support the scaling up of
necessary responses. Better planning and coordination
between public and private sector health providers and is
necessary and should be strengthened.
Study limitations
This study contains a number of limitations. First, the
rapid nature of the analysis was useful for simplicity,
speed, and limited cost but it also limits the extent and
the depth of the analyses. This limitation is alleviated by
the way the questionnaires and data collection proce-
dures were designed. Published and grey literature docu-
ments were reviewed prior to and after field visits to
prepare and verify the data received from the interviews.
Second, there are potential biases from key informants'
selection. These were mitigated by including resource
persons from different health system levels and sectors to
allow for the triangulation of results from various
sources. Additionally, the data collection including inter-
views was carried out by both external and local experts
to balance the views and to provide systematic, robust,
contextual understanding.
Third, the scope of the analysis is limited to pandemic
influenza and the health systems. Other competing
health care needs and priorities were assessed to a limited
e x t e n t  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  h e a l t h  c a r e  c o n t e x t .  R e l a t i v e
importance of those needs could influence how healthHanvoravongchai et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:322
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systems respond to pandemic influenza, which could add
to the complexity of the analysis. Additionally, a pan-
demic could create adverse social events beyond health
impacts and interrupts essential services such as food
logistics or water and electricity supply systems. Our
study did not explore multisectoral responses or the con-
tinuity of essential services beyond the health sector,
which is important and deserves further careful evalua-
tion.
Additional research should be conducted to shed more
light into pandemic preparation in these Asian countries.
A number of research activities are now going on as part
of the AsiaFluCap project. These include the analyses of
health system capacity and resource distribution in the
country, scenario development for identification of
resource requirements at different stages of a pandemic,
and stakeholder analyses to better understand the politi-
cal context and relationship between actors. Future
research may include the implications of pandemic pre-
paredness on health systems e.g. financial trend, health
workforce burden, the economic analyses of resource
needed to fill the capacity gaps, and so on.
Conclusion
The study in late 2008 prior to the H1N1/2009 epidemic
shows that the health system context influences how the
six countries have been preparing themselves for a pan-
demic. The level and form of pandemic preparedness
depend on existing health systems arrangements particu-
larly its governance, resource, and existing service provi-
sion patterns. The political and historical context of
previous epidemics shaped the priority given to pan-
demic preparation in a country. Countries with limited
domestic resources rely heavily on external funding for
pandemic preparation activities. The fragmentation of
health information and referral systems in some coun-
tries particularly in relation to linkage with private sector
providers constitutes a challenge in synergistic pandemic
response.
Pandemic preparation in the six Asian countries has
contributed to improvement in health system surveil-
lance, laboratory capacity, monitoring and evaluation and
public communications. However, preparation for pan-
demic mitigation in countries with low health system
resources is still rather limited. With the emergence of
H1N1/2009, the previous preparation in the five develop-
ing countries based on the AHI model of poultry to
human transmission became less relevant. If a pandemic
is to expand beyond the early containment phase it will
be a big challenge for these countries whether their health
system will have enough capacity to effectively respond.
A number of suggestions for improvement were pre-
sented to strengthen the pandemic preparation and miti-
g a t i o n  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  o v e r c o m e  t h r e e  a r e a s  o f  t h e
underlying health system constraints - governance and
stewardships, resources, and service provision. The
heightened public interest and awareness on the ongoing
pandemic could be mobilized towards more investment
in health systems.
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